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Lighting the Way Towards Liberty:
The Right to Abortion After Obergefell and
Whole Woman's Health
by ERIKA HANSON*

Introduction
Women in the U.S. have overcome numerous obstructions to their
advancement in society. Yet, despite evolving social and cultural views,
women in many states still face ongoing state-sanctioned subordination and
discrimination in the form of abortion restrictions. In order to take the next
step for women's equality and dignity, abortion rights advocates must adopt
a proactive legal strategy that will affirmatively guarantee abortion access
for all women, especially those most often subjected to discrimination.
Achieving this goal requires adopting comprehensive legal arguments that
can be applied to definitively invalidate all abortion restrictions. In light of
recent precedent, abortion rights advocates can employ sweeping legal
arguments to clearly establish that a woman's choice regarding her bodily
autonomy is essential, not only to her innate dignity and equality, but to the
liberty guaranteed to her under the Fourteenth Amendment. This strategy
will invalidate not just unconstitutional restrictions, but will also remedy the
most invidious, discriminatory, and long-standing obstacles to women's
equality by requiring the government to provide abortion coverage for
women who receive their insurance through Medicaid.
The confluence of recent developments in both abortion rights
jurisprudence and substantive due process jurisprudence has delivered the
abortion rights movement a critical opportunity to claim every women's
right to dignity, autonomy and equality, and to strike down the worst abortion
restrictions once and for all. The 2016 Supreme Court decision in Whole
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Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, which reaffirmed the right to obtain an
abortion, made clear that abortion restrictions cannot masquerade as policies
theoretically protecting women's health, and undermined an effective
oppositional strategy to slowly erode the right to abortion.2 The ruling in
Whole Woman's Health has created a pivotal moment for the future of
abortion rights. In response, abortion opponents have mounted an open
assault on the right to abortion. To counter this, abortion rights advocates
could continue to proceed with a state-by-state, restriction-by-restriction
defense of the right to abortion, evidence being that this has abated the worst
attacks on the right thus far. Alternatively, the abortion rights movement
could eschew a reactionary stance in favor of a revolutionary one.
The reasoning and expanded understanding of liberty espoused by
Justice Kennedy in Obergefell v. Hodges3-the case which recognized the
right to same-sex marriage across the United States-illustrates how the core
principles of autonomy, dignity, and equality strengthen all substantive due
process rights, including the right to abortion. Just as the states' actions in
Obergefell deprived same-sex couples of their ability to make "intimate
choices that define personal identity and beliefs" and denied them equality

1.

Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).

2.

See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics ofProtection:Abortion Restrictions Under

Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1708 (2008) ("Initially, the [antiabortion] movement sought
to overturn Roe with a Human Life Amendment but was unable to muster the support needed to
amend the Constitution. With frustration mounting throughout the 1980s, one wing of the
movement turned to clinic violence.
Another began to develop strategies to reverse Roe
incrementally, through legislation and litigation that would erode support for abortion one step
at a time.").

3.

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

4.
The Fourteenth Amendment's doctrine of substantive due process protects some of our
most basic and valued fundamental rights from government intrusion. Substantive due process
requires the government to proffer a sufficient substantive reason to justify any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV, § 1; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due
Process, 15 TOURO L. REv. 1501, 1501 (1999). Among the rights protected under substantive due
process is the right to make personal decisions about family and parenthood with limited
interference from the state. This right is deeply ingrained in modern constitutional law, as cases
during the last century have established the right to direct the education of one's children, Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923), the right to raise one's children as one sees fit, Pierce v.

Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the right to use contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381

U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (holding laws forbidding the use of contraception violated the privacy
rights of married couples); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (holding prohibitions on
contraception violated single persons' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment), and the right to sexual intimacy, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Also

included in this line of cases is the right to abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992); Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S.
Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016), and the right to marry, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), including
same-sex marriage, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).
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under the law,5 state actions restricting a woman's right to abortion deprive
her of her ability to determine the course of her life and fail to recognize that
men and women have an equal claim to dignity under the Constitution.
The principle that connects Whole Woman's Health and Obergefell is
deeper and more basic than the right to make decisions about family and
personal relationships-these cases are built upon the right of all persons to
live within a government structure in which the "State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny." 6 Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment
not only shields individuals from government intrusion, it also entitles them
to a government structure that allows all persons to "participate equally in
the economic and social life of the Nation,"7 without regard to immutable
characteristics such as race, sex, or sexual orientation. This principle is
liberty. As Obergefell demonstrates, liberty requires that the government
refrain from infringing upon an individual's fundamental rights, and that it
affirmatively facilitates the realization of those very rights.
This Article advocates for reconnecting the right to abortion to the
principles of liberty in the same way that marriage was linked to liberty in
the marriage equality context.
Such a strategy will fortify abortion
jurisprudence and defeat all restrictions, including those denying lowincome women public Medicaid coverage of abortion. The idea that
women's equality and dignity are inextricably linked to their autonomy in
making reproductive health decisions is the foundational premise of the
abortion rights movement. This tenet can be realized in a viable legal
strategy by broadly and explicitly tying the right to abortion to liberty, as
expounded by the Supreme Court in other contexts.
This Article begins by reviewing the reasoning of Justice Kennedy in
Obergefell and highlighting the unique way in which Obergefell clarifies
substantive due process jurisprudence. Part II will apply the principles of
Obergefell to a woman's fundamental right to decide whether to carry her
pregnancy to term. Finally, Part III examines Justice Thomas' dissent in
Obergefell, which criticizes Justice Kennedy's majority opinion as requiring
proactive action on the part of the state to satisfy substantive due process.
Part IV applies a theory of "fulfilled due process"-which requires state
actors to respect fundamental rights, as well as facilitate their exercise-to
abortion restrictions. Specifically, Part III concludes that under a fulfilled
due process theory, not only are prohibitions on public funding of abortion
coverage unconstitutional, but also that the Constitution affirmatively
requires this benefit.
5.
6.
7.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
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I. A New Understanding of Liberty: Obergefell v. Hodges
The majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges is transcendent, and not
solely because it recognized the right for same-sex couples to marry. In
recognizing this fundamental right, the opinion adopts a commonsense
approach to substantive due process that considers the dignity and autonomy
of individuals in context. Specifically, Obergefell's vision of liberty clearly
outlines the evolution of fundamental rights over time. It dedicates special
consideration to the inequality that deprivations of due process impose upon
subordinated groups, and acknowledges the critical role of the courts in
protecting the rights of the minority from the political will of the majority.
In doing so, the Court evinces a fuller understanding of liberty that more
adequately addresses the dignity, autonomy, and equality concerns
implicated when subordinated groups are denied fundamental rights, and the
need to protect these rights from unnecessary government interference.
A. A Common Law Approach to Substantive Due Process
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by
Justice Kennedy, held that, "the right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be
deprived of that right and that liberty." 8 The Court grounded marriage in the
constellation of other fundamental rights protected by the Constitution,
including decisions "concerning contraception, family relationships,
procreation, and childbearing."9 The unifying similarity between all of the
substantive due process rights-including marriage-the Court reasoned, is
that each is "center to individual dignity and autonomy" and necessarily
concerns "intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs." 10
Beyond recognizing that an individual's autonomy and dignity are at
stake in the adjudication of fundamental rights, Obergefell updated the
doctrine of substantive due process to acknowledge that laws affecting the
liberties of particular groups often carry unique stigmatic injuries. In doing
so, the Court moved beyond the traditional due process framework of
fundamental rights, which typically begins by determining whether the right
in question constitutes a fundamental right. Under this approach, a right is
fundamental if it has been recognized as so in prior case law or if it is "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition and implicit in the concept of

8.
9.
10.
11.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
Id. at 2599.
Id. at 2597.
Id. at 2602.
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ordered liberty." 1 2 If a right is determined to be fundamental, the state cannot
infringe upon it unless that infringement is "narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest." 1 3
In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy rejected this framework, instead
embracing a common law approach to fundamental rights in which the
understanding of tradition evolves with the times. 14 This analysis reflects a
reasoned judgment approach to fundamental rights, as first espoused by
Justice Harlan in his 1961 dissent in Poe v. Ullman,1 5 and adopted in
Griswold v. Connecticut1 6 and Planned Parenthoodv. Casey> Under this
approach, the Court must weigh fundamental rights against the governmental
interest in a way that recognizes tradition, but also the evolution of that
tradition over time.18
While Obergefell emphasized the historical
importance of the fundamental right to marriage, the Court noted that the
marital institution has not remained stagnant.
Specifically, the
understanding that "women have their own equal dignity" is a "new
dimension[] of freedom" that has become evident to new generations-as
women's role and status in society has changed, society's understanding of
marriage has evolved also. 19 The institution of marriage has changed from
one of coverture, in which the woman had no legal rights or recognition, to
a more perfect institution that honors companionship, love, and equal dignity
between spouses. 20 In denying same-sex couples this latter understanding of

12. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) and Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
13. Washington, 521 U.S. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
14.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.

Marriage has been recognized as a fundamental right

since 1967, when the Court held in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967), that laws prohibiting
interracial marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses. In Obergefell, however, the dissenters argued that the right at issue in this case was not
"marriage" but whether the Court could alter the definition of the fundamental right to marriage
and therefore, the majority should have analyzed the right as if it had not been previously

adjudicated as fundamental. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2619 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Id. at 2642
(Alito, J., dissenting).
15.
16.
17.

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 524-25 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
381 U.S. at 485-86.
505 U.S. at 845-46.

18.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 ("The nature of injustice is that we may not always see it
in our own times. The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment did not presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they
entrusted to future generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we
learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution's central protections
and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.").

19.
20.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595-97.
Id. at 2595.
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marriage, the Court reasoned, the state was denying same-sex couples not
just the fundamental right to marry, but was stigmatizing them and their
relationships as lesser than opposite-sex relationships.2 1
B. The Application of Equality Principles to Vindicate Fundamental Rights
In Obergefell, the injury that same-sex couples suffered extended
beyond a simple lack of access to public benefits that accompany the state's
recognition of marriage.22 The Court paid special attention to the stigmatic
injury of marriage equality bans, which embodied public attitudes that samesex couples were not fit to participate as equal members of the social order.23
The Court further noted that the stigmatization of gay and lesbian people has
not been limited to marriage bans. Rather, there has been a "long history of
disapproval" of nonheterosexual people in general. 24 Applying equal
protection principles, the Court reasoned that this history of subordination
exposed a special cause to be skeptical of the justifications for denying samesex couples the fundamental right to marry.25
Many commentators have criticized the lack of clarity that resulted
from the majority's refusal to confine the analysis of marriage equality bans
to the doctrinal framework of either substantive due process or equal
26
th
But the transformative nature of Obergefell lies in this
protection.
deliberate
intermingling.27
Kenji Yoshino
coined the term
"antisubordination liberty" to describe Justice Kennedy's vision of liberty
embraced in Obergefell.28
Antisubordination liberty encompasses

21.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2601-02 ("As the State itself makes marriage all the more
precious by the significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching
that gays and lesbians are unequal in important respects. It demeans gays and lesbians for the State
to lock them out of a central institution of the Nation's society.").
22. Id. at 2604 ("Here the marriage laws enforced by the respondents are in essence
unequal: same-sex couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are
barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of
their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave and
continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and
subordinate them.").

23.
24.
25.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
Id. at 2604.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.

26.
See, e.g., Ilya Somin, A Great Decision On Same-Sex Marriage- But Based On
DubiousReasoning, WASH. POST (June 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/26/a-great-decision-on-same-sex-marriage-but-based-ondubious-reasoning/.

27. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth ofFreedom?:Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REv. 147,
168 (2015).
28. Id. at 174.
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considerations of dignity, autonomy, and equality. 29 Under this principle,
substantive due process analysis, i.e., the adjudication of fundamental rights,
must acknowledge that government intrusions into the fundamental rights of
subordinated groups have the extra adverse effect of propagating
inequality.30 Instead of acting as disparate legal concepts, liberty and
equality principles work together and each "leads to a stronger understanding
of the other." 31 Thus, the Court's role in substantive due process analysis is
to protect those who have traditionally faced discrimination.
Obergefell rolls equal protection analysis into substantive due process
analysis in a way that creates a fuller understanding of what it means for the
government to deprive a subordinated group of liberty.32 This principle is
actually quite rational: A lack of equal autonomy and dignity inevitably leads
to a lack of equality.33 When equality principles inform fundamental rights
analysis, it becomes clear that true equality dictates more than theoretical
equal treatment, but rather affirmative protection of historically subordinated
groups. In denying same-sex couples the affirmative recognition of their
relationships through marriage and the attendant governmental benefits, the
government was depriving same-sex couples not just of their autonomy and
dignity in making intimate personal decisions relating to family, but also
treating them as truly unequal under the law.34 Therefore, it was not enough
to simply afford same-sex couples the ability to participate in relationships.35
The Court in Obergefell took the critical step of extending the public
recognition and benefits granted to opposite-sex couples to same-sex couples
and treating them as equals. Obergefell makes clear that courts should
employ equal protection principles to help identify and correct inequalities
in the distribution of fundamental rights, thus vindicating liberty for
historically subordinated groups under the Constitution.3 6

29.

Yoshino, supra note 27, at 171-72.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 175.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
Id.
Id. at 2602.
Id. at 2604.

35.
See Id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners cannot claim, under the most
plausible definition of 'liberty,' that they have been imprisoned or physically restrained by the
States for participating in same-sex relationships. To the contrary, they have been able to cohabitate
and raise their children in peace. They have been able to hold civil marriage ceremonies in States
that recognize same-sex marriages and private religious ceremonies in all States.").

36.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
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C. The Role of the Courts in High-Stakes Politics
The antisubordination principle also counteracts the tyranny of the
majority by maintaining a healthy skepticism whenever the political process
seeks to limit the autonomy of certain groups. As the stakes of political
debate increase, the person or group of people at the center of the controversy
are often lost, yet ultimately, they shoulder the burdens. While traditional
political processes attempt to resolve issues, individuals can easily be denied
equal rights.
Oftentimes, these individuals belong to historically
subordinated groups and have less political power at the outset. Subjecting
individual rights to the will of the majority through the political process is
contrary to the Constitution and the doctrine of fundamental rights, as
"fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote" and "they depend on
the outcome of no elections."37
By the time marriage equality reached the Supreme Court, it was at a
critical juncture. After Lawrence v. Texas, 38 in which the Supreme Court
struck down Texas' antisodomy law, which was used to target gay men, as
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, marriage equality gained
immense support in most states. 39 On the other hand, same-sex couples in
some states faced severe backlash. Multiple states took the ultimate step to
ban same-sex marriage completely. 40 These politics had become extreme
and deprived people in some states of their rights, thereby rendering this
group politically powerless.4 1 When "sincere, personal opposition becomes
enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the
imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or
stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied." 42 When politics come
to this point, the Court is obligated to step in to protect the rights of the
powerless group. The result of the political process may well be to extend
equal rights to subordinated groups. Nevertheless, when the process acts to
37.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605-06 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.

624, 638 (1943)) ("The idea of the Constitution 'was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."'). See also James Madison, Speech
in the Virginia Constitutional Convention (Dec. 2, 1829) ("In Republics, the great danger is, that
the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the Minority.").

38.

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.

39.

William N. Eskridge Jr., The MarriageEquality Cases and ConstitutionalTheory, CATO

SUP. CT. REV. 2015-2016 111, 135 (2015).
40. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593 (citing bans in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee);
see also Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (challenge to California's Proposition 8,
which amended the California Constitution to ban same-sex marriage).
41. Eskridge Jr., supra note 39, at 135. (In the states where same-sex marriage had been
outlawed, the political process was "just too strongly stacked against sexual minorities.").

42.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
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suppress people's rights, especially those of historically subordinated
groups, the stakes have become too high, and the Court must act as a
backstop.43 Equality of the minority should not and cannot be subject to the
whims of the majority.
The majority opinion in Obergefell articulates a common-sense
approach to substantive due process. By adopting a fundamental rights
analysis that accounts for the evolution of society's understanding of
autonomy and dignity, the special harms to historically subordinated groups
when they are denied fundamental rights, and the Court's role to protect
individual's rights from the political process, Obergefell puts forth a more
complete vision of liberty. This vision of liberty can and should extend
beyond the context of marriage equality to protect other subordinated groups
from government deprivation of fundamental rights.

II. Liberty and Abortion after Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt
The comprehensive understanding of liberty in Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Obergefell can light the way to the future legal strategies
of abortion rights advocates. A woman's right to decide whether to have an
abortion has long been recognized as central to her dignity and autonomy.4
It has also been recognized as integral to her ability to participate equally in
society under the law without being forced into "a particular course of life." 45
In the wake of the Supreme Court's most recent decision affirming a
woman's right to abortion, it is time for abortion rights advocates to lay the
groundwork for an Obergefell-like decision that will definitively guarantee
women's autonomy, dignity, and equality with regards to abortion.
A. The Fundamental Right to Abortion
As with the fundamental right to marry examined in Obergefell, the
right to decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term is deeply rooted in due
process jurisprudence. The choice to bear a child is a fundamental right
based on the ability of persons to make decisions about family and
procreation without undue interference from the state.46 A woman's decision

43.

Eskridge Jr., supra note 39, at 134.

44.

See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 ("Roe

recognized the right of a woman to make certain fundamental decisions affecting her destiny and
confirmed once more that the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive
dimension of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.").
45. Eskridge Jr., supra note 39, at 119 (quoting JOHN C. HURD, TOPICS OF JURISPRUDENCE
CONNECTED WITH CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE 44 (1856)); see also Planned

Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
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whether to carry a pregnancy to term involves "the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal
dignity and autonomy" and is "central to the liberty protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment."47 When an abortion restriction has "the purpose
or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion," the government unduly burdens a woman's liberty in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment.48
Just as the understanding of the fundamental right to marriage has
evolved as women's role and status in society has changed, so has the
understanding of the fundamental right to abortion. At the founding of the
nation, and through much of the nineteenth century, a woman did not have
any legal existence separate from her husband. A woman had no property
rights, no right to contract, and no right to sue. 49 According to Blackstone,
a legal theorist often cited today in support of a limited view of substantive
due process,5 0 a woman had no individual dignity or autonomy.5 1 Even after

the use and acceptance of coverture gradually eroded by the end of the
nineteenth century, "invidious sex-based classifications in marriage
remained common through the mid-twentieth century. "52
"These
53
classifications denied the equal dignity of men and women."
The
persistence of the marital rape exemption is a prime example. At common
law, a husband could not be liable for raping his wife under the theory that
by agreeing to marry, a woman was also agreeing to renounce any control of
her body.54 The purpose of the marital rape exemption was to deny women
bodily autonomy in order to subordinate their status to that of men. Beyond
the legal consequences, invidious sex-based classifications like the marital
rape exemption inflict direct harm upon women's lived experiences. Studies
of women's subordinated role in marriage have shown that these

47.
48.

Id. at 877.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

49.

Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of MaritalRape, 88 CALIF. L.

REv. 1373, 1382 (2000).
50. See e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2632-33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
51.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, ESQ., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 430
(Leslie B. Adams, Jr. ed., (1983)) (1765) ("a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or enter into
covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose her separate existence; and to covenant with
her, would be only to covenant with himself').

52.
53.
54.
55.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
Id.
Hasday, supra note 49, at 1399-1400.
Id. at 1375.
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classifications denied them control of their own bodies and hindered their
advancement in social life.5 6
These invidious sex-based classifications, typically based on the
common law understanding of a woman's role in the family, have shaped the
lives of all women regardless of their marital status. As recently as the
1960s, the Court subscribed to this theory explicitly-regarding women "as
the center of home and family life, with attendant special responsibilities that
precluded full and independent legal status under the Constitution." 5 7
Finally, in 1992, the Court in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey recognized that
such views "are no longer consistent with our understanding of the family,
the individual, or the Constitution." 5 8 In striking down a Pennsylvania law
that required a woman seeking an abortion to notify her spouse, the Court in
Casey made clear that the "Constitution protects all individuals, male or
female, married or unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power, even
where that power is employed for the supposed benefit of a member of the
individual's family." 59 Although women have gained the right to vote, to
own property, to contract, and to sue, they still face obstacles in the exercise
of their bodily autonomy. Abortion restrictions remain as a poignant vestige
of the legacy of coverture and other invidious sex-based classifications,
depriving women of their bodily autonomy, dignity, and the ability to
participate equally in society.
B. Equality Principles, Women's Subordination, and Abortion Restrictions
Just like the history of subordination of same-sex couples in Obergefell,
the above-detailed history of women's subordination exposes a special need
to be skeptical of the reasons for abortion restrictions. The subordination of
women also demands a searching inquiry into the restrictions' effect on the
equality of women. Under the antisubordination principle, when evaluating
a government intrusion on a fundamental right, the courts must take into
account the effect of this intrusion on groups that have traditionally faced
discrimination, as the courts would under equal protection analysis. This
consideration is even more important in the context of abortion, where the
right is not only directly tied to women's autonomy, but also to the sexstereotype of women as mothers. The Court has observed that in abortion,

56.

Hasday, supra note 49, at 1406-13.

57.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 897 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hoyt v. Florida, 368

U.S. 57, 62 (1961)).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 898.
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[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a
child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain
that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning
of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles
her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot
alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her
suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without
more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that
vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The
destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own
conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.60
Abortion restrictions have worked to the detriment of women's equality
in two distinct ways. First, similar to the bans on same-sex marriage in
Obergefell, by limiting a woman's right to exercise control over her body
and life, abortion restrictions signal to society that a woman is unworthy of
equal dignity, propagating historical stereotypes. This stigmatization is in
some ways worse than coverture and the marital rape exemption, where a
woman's husband deprived her of bodily autonomy. Here, the government
is codifying in law or policy the view that women are less worthy of
autonomy than men.6 1 Moreover, although Obergefell turned on dignitary
harms, abortion restrictions have quantifiable negative impacts on a
woman's life and future. One study, which compared women who wanted
an abortion but were unable to obtain one to women who were able to receive
one, found that one year later, the women denied an abortion were more
likely to be receiving public assistance, were more likely to be living below
the federal poverty line, and were less likely to be employed in a full-time
job.62 As the plurality observed in Casey, the ability of a woman to

60.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.

61.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (noting that such a declaration "in
and of itself is an invitation to subject . . persons to discrimination both in the public and in the
private spheres.").
62.
Seventy-six percent of the women denied an abortion were receiving public assistance
compared to forty-four percent of women who received an abortion. Diana Greene Foster,
Presentation at the American Public Health Ass'n Annual Meeting & Expo: Socioeconomic
Consequences of Abortion Compared to Unwanted Birth (Oct. 30, 2012) (https://apha.
confex.com/apha/140am/webprogram/Paper263858.html).
Forty-eight percent of the women
denied an abortion were employed in full-time jobs compared to fifty-eight percent of women who
received an abortion. Id. Sixty-seven percent of the women who were denied an abortion were
below the federal poverty line compared to fifty-six percent who received an abortion. Id.; see also
Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., The Effect ofAbortion on Having andAchievingAspirational One-Year
Plans, 15 BMC WOMEN'S HEALTH 102 (2015) (finding that women who were able to have an
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participate equally in society is facilitated by her ability to make autonomous
reproductive health decisions.6 3 Studies like this show that the opposite
result is also borne out in women's lived experiences: Restrictions on a
woman's ability to make autonomous reproductive health decisions impede
her ability to participate in society.
The application of equal protection principles and an antisubordination
understanding of substantive due process makes it clear that in order for
women to achieve equality in society, the courts must ensure protection of
their autonomy and dignity. The dignitary and practical harms inflicted upon
women by abortion restrictions amount to a denial of equal liberty. These
harms are more than enough to constitute an undue burden on a woman's
right to abortion as required by current abortion rights doctrine, and
furthermore constitute a violation of the principles of autonomy, dignity, and
equality generally guaranteed by the Constitution.
C. The Politics of Abortion
Because of the threats posed to both women's liberty and women's
equality by abortion restrictions, and because of a movement towards a
complete ban on abortion, the current climate demands a resounding
declaration of a woman's right to decide whether and when to carry a
pregnancy to term.
In June 2016, the Supreme Court held in Whole Woman's Health that
an abortion restriction is unconstitutional if the burdens that the law places
on women seeking an abortion outweigh the benefits to the government.6
The Court made clear that judges and justices have an obligation to conduct
a searching evidence-based inquiry-and thus cannot defer to legislators'
claims-into the benefits and burdens of an abortion restriction.65 The
holding was a major victory against the proliferation of Targeted Regulation
of Abortion Providers ("TRAP") laws. Under the guise of protecting
women's health, TRAP laws specifically target abortion and abortion
providers by imposing requirements on them that are more burdensome than
those imposed on similar medical procedures and practices.66 Even though
abortion providers are already subject to the same health, safety, and
professional regulations as similar providers and health centers, states have

abortion had six times higher odds of having positive life plans-most commonly related to
education and employment-and are more likely to achieve them than women denied an abortion).

63.
64.
65.

Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
136 S. Ct. at 2300.
Id. at 2310.

66.
CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS
(2015), https://www.reproductiverights.org/project/targeted-regulation-of-abortion-providers-trap.
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imposed medically unnecessary restrictions on them-such as costly and
unnecessary facility modifications-in order to burden women's right to
abortion.67 These regulations, in effect, make it harder or impossible for the
providers to remain open and serve patients, while increasing costs and
delays. HB 2, the Texas statute struck down in Whole Woman's Health,
required providers to have admitting privileges at local hospitals and
required providers to meet ambulatory surgical center standards. 68 As a
result of HB 2, twenty-one out of forty abortion providers in the state of
Texas had already closed before the Supreme Court argument, and at least
eleven more would have closed-leaving only ten-had the statute not been
struck down by the Court. 69 The Court held that "neither of these [HB 2]
provisions confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the burdens upon
access that each imposes. Each places a substantial obstacle in the path of
women seeking a previability abortion, each constitutes an undue burden on
abortion access, and each violates the Federal Constitution."7 o
In the wake of Whole Woman's Health, the antiabortion movement can
no longer hide behind the pretext of protecting women's health to chip away
at the right to abortion, nor can they resort to the previously unsuccessful
strategy of focusing solely on the fetus. 7 1 Shortly after the decision in Whole
Woman's Health, various states abandoned their TRAP laws and abortion
rights advocates have brought actions in other states in light of the Supreme
Court's ruling.72 As further evidence of the breadth of the holding in Whole
Woman's Health, antiabortion advocates have stepped away from promoting
TRAP laws as a way to limit abortion access. For example, Americans
United for Life-the antiabortion group responsible for drafting Texas's
unconstitutional TRAP laws-removed their admitting privileges model bill
from their antiabortion model legislation for the 2017 legislative sessions.73

67. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM., TARGETED REGULATION OF ABORTION PROVIDERS (TRAP)
LAWS: DECREASING ACCESS, DRIVING PROVIDERS AWAY (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://www.prochoiceamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/1.-Targeted-Regulation-ofAbortion-Providers-TRAP-Laws-Decreasing-Access-Driving-Providers-Away.doc.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
Id. at 2312.
Id. at 2300 (internal citations omitted).
See Siegel, supra note 2, at 1716.
CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 2016 STATE OF THE STATES: A PIVOTAL TIME FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS (Jan. 2017), https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civic
actions.net/files/documents/USPAStateofStates_11.16_WebFinal.pdf.
73. See, e.g., AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, ABORTION PROVIDERS' ADMITTING PRIVLEGES ACT:
MODEL LEGISLATION & POLICY GUIDE FOR THE 2016 LEGISLATIVE YEAR (2015), ;http://aul.org/
downloads/2016-Legislative-Guides/WPP/Abortion Providers AdmittingPrivilegesAct
2016_LG.pdf; AM. UNITED FOR LIFE, UNSAFE: How THE PUBLIC HEALTH CRISIS IN AMERICA'S
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After this judicial loss, the antiabortion movement has no choice but to
mount an open assault on abortion rights, and they have already begun. Less
than two weeks into the 2017 state legislative sessions, forty-six abortion
restrictions were introduced. 4 These new bills have a decidedly different
focus than the pre-textual and incrementalist laws abounded before Whole
Woman's Health-they are in both purpose and effect, total bans on
abortion. For example, multiple states and the House of Representatives
have introduced bills banning abortion as early as six weeks, before many
States are increasingly introducing
women even know they are pregnant.
bans that completely prohibit abortion after twenty weeks and others banning
the most common method of later-term abortions.76 Laws that eliminate
insurance coverage of abortion for individuals who receive their health
insurance through federal or state Medicaid or other government insurance
programs have also proliferated. Thus, the political stakes of abortion have
increased as the antiabortion movement begins to promote restrictions that
amount to total bans on abortion.
Just as Lawrence v. Texas forced a critical juncture in the political
debate surrounding marriage equality,
Whole Woman's Health has
similarly brought the political debate surrounding abortion to a head. It is
time for the Court to intervene to protect the rights of women in the same
way that it did to protect the rights of same-sex couples. To enable this result,
abortion rights advocates must end their incrementalist and defensive
approach to these unconstitutional bans on abortion. Now is the time for
abortion rights advocates to orchestrate an Obergefell-like bookend at the
Supreme Court, solidifying the equal liberty of women.
After Obergefell, substantive due process doctrine no longer tolerates
"neutral" laws that have the effect of demeaning the dignity of certain
historically subordinated groups. The antisubordination principle requires a
more searching inquiry into the motivations of legislators who seek to
ABORTION
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(2016),

(http://unsafereport.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/12/AUL UNSAFEreport.pdf).
74. Olivia Becker, At Least 46Anti-Abortion Bills Are Already In Frontof State Legislatures,
VICE NEWS Jan. 12, 2017, https://news.vice.com/story/at-least-46-anti-abortion-bills-are-alreadyin-front-of-state-legislatures-in-2017.
75. See Heartbeat Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 490, 115th Cong. (2017); Ark. Code Ann. §§
20-16-1301 through 1307 (2013); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.1 (2013); H.B. 493, 131st Gen. Assemb.
(Ohio 2016).
76. See Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends in the States: 2016, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan.
2017), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2017/01/policy-trends-states-2016.
77. See Alina Salganicoff et al., Coveragefor Abortion Services in Medicaid, Marketplace Plans
and Private Plans, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Jan. 20, 2016), http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/issuebrief/coverage-for-abortion-services-in-medicaid-marketplace-plans-and-private-plans/.
78. See supra Part I.C.
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infringe upon the rights of these groups. This type of review challenges the
Court to look past several layers of pretext. In passing HB 2, Texas
lawmakers used concern for women's health as an excuse to restrict abortion.
Moreover, the project of restricting abortion is itself an excuse to obstruct
the advancement of women's equal participation in society. 79 The Court in
Whole Woman's Health invalidated HB 2 by piercing this first layer of
pretext. To safeguard abortion rights fully, courts must acknowledge what
activists have appreciated for decades: Abortion restrictions are not merely
an attempt to regulate a common medical procedure, but are also an avenue
for regulating women's liberty writ large.
Application of the formulation of liberty embraced by Obergefellwhich acknowledges the interrelation of autonomy, dignity, and equalityis the next logical step in abortion jurisprudence. 80 The equality of women
demands a resounding rejection of the invidious, discriminatory, and
demeaning effects of abortion restrictions on women's lives. Abortion
advocates must rise to the challenge and apply proactive pressure to
achieve equality.

79. Similarly, the Texas legislators in Lawrence v. Texas used a pre-textual moral
justification to ban same-sex sodomy. 123 S. Ct. at 582 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To strike down
the law as unconstitutional, the Court was required to recognize both that morality was an
insufficient justification and that regulating same-sex sexual relations was a method of regulating
gay and lesbian people as a group-"demean[ing] their existence." See also Id. at 578.
80. Justice Kennedy's understanding of liberty in Obergefell is instructive because he
remains the center of the Court on abortion. Yet some critics are skeptical of Justice Kennedy's
commitment to applying an evolved standard of substantive due process to abortion rights, given
his majority opinion in Gonzalez v. Carhart,in which he relied upon paternalistic views of women
to uphold a ban on a method of later abortion. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
Specifically, he relied on an unsubstantiated assumption that "some women come to regret their
choice. . . ." Id. at 159. While it is likely difficult for abortion rights advocates to place their hopes
in a Justice who has echoed some of the very justifications used to subordinate women, both Justice
Kennedy's understanding of liberty and the legal landscape surrounding the Fourteenth
Amendment have changed since Carhart.
Notably, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Obergefell firmly embraces the reasoned judgment
approach to substantive due process, in which fundamental rights are permitted to evolve with
tradition. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. Under this approach, and taking into the account the
continued advancement of women in society, the gender paternalism in Carhartclearly is no longer
a valid justification to restrict abortion.
Not only has society evolved past acceptance of gender paternalism as justification for
restricting women's autonomy, but such restrictions are also wholly antithetical to the
antisubordination view of liberty animating the reasoning of Obergefell. Although he fell prey to
the pre-textual justifications proffered for a restriction on abortion in Carhart, Justice Kennedy
joined the majority in Whole Woman's Health, which saw through these justifications for what they
were: pretext for limiting the right to abortion. Admittedly, the line from Roe and Casey through
to Whole Women's Health has not been one of unbroken progression; Carhart represents a
stumbling block. Yet "liberty must not be extinguished for want of a line that is clear." Casey, 505
U.S. at 869.
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III. Fulfilled Due Process: Justice Thomas' Dissent in Obergefell
and its Application to Public Insurance Coverage of Abortion
It is true that abortion rights advocates have long emphasized the
importance of fundamental abortion rights to a woman's dignity, autonomy,
and equality. Obergefell provides a more organized framework for these
arguments. It also suggests that equal protection concerns should undergird
and strengthen claims of substantive due process in abortion jurisprudence.
Yet Obergefell's vision of liberty does much more. In his dissent, Justice
Thomas interpreted the majority's decision in the case as a sharp break from
history: "In the American legal tradition, liberty has long been understood as
individual freedom from governmental action, not as a right to a particular
governmental entitlement."8 1
Nevertheless, Obergefell does require
affirmative government action. States must not only affirmatively recognize
same-sex marriages, but they also must grant these couples the attendant
government benefits. 82
Under Justice Thomas' understanding, the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause cannot require any such affirmative government action. 83
The majority in Obergefell could have avoided this conflict by analyzing the
same-sex marriage bans under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause.
Under Equal Protection, the Court can remedy
inequalities in benefits, not just rights.84 The majority could have held that
denying marriage on the basis of sexual orientation violated the Equal
Protection Clause.8 5 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy did not rely on this

reasoning, instead choosing to analyze same-sex marriage bans in terms of
liberty and the Due Process Clause.

In doing so, he recognized that

sometimes, to "achieve the full promise of liberty,"86 the government must
grant affirmative rights to historically subordinated groups.87 Under this
view, the Constitution not only guarantees fundamental rights and equal
protection under law, but also their synergy. Thus, the State must
affirmatively facilitate subordinated groups' exercise of their rights to foster

true equality.
In the context of abortion, the State does not and cannot fulfill due
process as long as it denies coverage for low-income women who are eligible

81.
82.
83.

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2634 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2635-36.
Id. at 2636.

84.

Yoshino, supra note 27, at 168.

85.
86.
87.

Id.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
Id. at 2602.
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for Medicaid. While the Obergefell formulation of liberty is helpful in
shoring up constitutional arguments against other types of abortion
restrictions, it is potentially revolutionary in the context of requiring
Medicaid coverage of abortion for low-income women, restrictions on which
have been particularly difficult for abortion rights advocates to overcome.
In 1976, Congress passed the Hyde Amendment, a rider attached to an annual
appropriations bill which prohibits federal Medicaid coverage of abortion
care except in very limited circumstances. 8 8 In 1980, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment in Harrisv. McRae. 89
The Court reasoned that the Hyde Amendment's funding restrictions did not
infringe upon a woman's liberty interest protected by the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause:
[A]lithough government may not place obstacles in the path of a
woman's exercise of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those
not of its own creation .... The financial constraints that restrict an
indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally
protected freedom of choice are the product not of governmental
restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency. 90

.

While some state courts have held that state funding restrictions-like
those in the Hyde Amendment-violate state constitutional principles, 91 the
Amendment and McRae have created a lasting two-tiered system of
fundamental rights in which the government denies a group of women their
right to abortion simply because of their income. In fact, this was the purpose
of the Hyde Amendment. Representative Henry Hyde admitted during
debate that he was specifically targeting low-income women simply because
they were within his reach: "I certainly would like to prevent, if I could
legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle-class woman,
or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the . .
Medicaid bill." 92
88. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1976).
89. 448 U.S. 297, 317 (1980).
90. Id. at 316.
91. See State v. Planned Parenthood of Alaska, 28 P.3d 904 (Alaska 2001); Simat Corp. v.
Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys., 56 P.3d 28 (Ariz. 2002); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247 (Ind. 2003); Moe
v. Sec'y of Admin. & Fin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Women of the State of Minn. v. Gomez,
542 N.W.2d 17 (Minn. 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); New Mexico
Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 975 P.2d 841 (N.M. 1998); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Dep't of Human Res., 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on statutory grounds, 687 P.2d 785
(Or. 1984); Women's Health Ctr. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1993).
92. 123 CONG. REC.19,700 (1977) (statement of Rep. Henry Hyde).
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The Hyde Amendment and similar denials of funding place an often
insurmountable barrier in the way of a low-income woman seeking an
abortion. Seventeen percent of women were enrolled in Medicaid as of
2015,93 and previous studies indicate that up to one in four women who
qualify for Medicaid are forced to carry a pregnancy to term because they
are unable to secure funding for an abortion.9 4 Others are forced to delay the
procedure while they raise funds, increasing both health risks to the women
and the cost of the procedure. 95 Regardless of the cause, when women are
denied an abortion they are more likely to be forced further into poverty,
creating a vicious cycle for them and their families. 96 The Hyde Amendment
and similar restrictions also produce well-documented, disparate impacts on
women of color. 97
These unjust realities support various convincing arguments for
overturning funding restrictions.98 Now, under Obergefell and Whole
Woman's Health, the antisubordination theory of liberty explicitly requires
the courts to examine these realities as evidence of the lack of equal
treatment created by government infringement upon fundamental rights. 99
As in Obergefell, the harm to a woman's dignity alone should be enough to
show that these funding restrictions pose an undue burden on the right to
abortion. However, unlike typical abortion restrictions that can be remedied
simply by striking the statute, the remedy for funding restrictions requires
affirmative action by the state.
93.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Women's Health Insurance Coverage (Oct. 21, 2016),
http://kff.org/womens-health-policy/fact-sheet/womens-health-insurance-coverage-fact-sheet/.
94.
Stanley K. Henshaw et al., Restrictionson Medicaid Fundingfor Abortions: A Literature
Review, GUTTMACHER INST. (June 2009), https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/
files/reportpdf/medicaidlitreview.pdf.

95.

Id.

96.

See Foster, supra note 62; Upadhyay, supra note 62.

97.
See Jessica Arons & Lindsay Rosenthal, How the Hyde Amendment Discriminates
Against Poor Women and Women of Color, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (May 10, 2013), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2013/05/10/62875/how-the-hyde-amendmentdiscriminates-against-poor-women-and-women-of-color/.
98.

See Jill E. Adams & Jessica Arons, A Travesty ofJustice: Revisiting Harrisv. McRae, 21

WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 5 (2014).
99.
Although funding restrictions of abortion coverage do not affect all women seeking an
abortion, this is irrelevant in the constitutional analysis. In Casey, the Court noted that "[1]egislation
is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those whose conduct it affects
.... The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant." Casey, 505 U.S. at 894. Thus, the only group relevant
in the adjudication of funding restrictions is the Medicaid-eligible women affected by the ban. This
proposition was reaffirmed by the Court in 2015, in City of Los Angeles v. Patel, which held that
the proper focus of a facial challenge is on the applications of the statute that actually authorizes or

prohibits the conduct in question. City of L.A. v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015) (citing Casey,
505 U.S. at 894).
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Obergefell supplies the critical piece of the legal argument to overturn
McRae and invalidate restrictions on public insurance coverage of abortion.
The vision of liberty embraced in Obergefell requires affirmative, positive
action by the government to remedy unequal treatment and the harm it has
created.
In Obergefell, a historically subordinated group-same-sex
couples-was granted not just access to the fundamental right to marry, but
also to the governmental benefits associated with marriage. Without this
final step, same-sex couples could not truly exercise their fundamental rights
and as a result, their liberty would have remained unfulfilled and their dignity
demeaned. Likewise, funding restrictions prevent low-income women from
achieving the "full promise of liberty." 00 Fulfilled due process dictates that
the historically subordinated group-women-be granted public coverage
of abortion.>o"
Without it, these women truly cannot exercise their
fundamental rights, and the Constitution's dual promises of liberty and equal
dignity will remain out of reach.

Conclusion
Without intervention, the political process will threaten the fundamental
rights of subordinated groups, as it is likely that the majoritarian process will
underrepresent and underserve the needs of those who lack political power.
Although many opponents of substantive due process criticize the doctrine
for expanding society's understanding of fundamental rights, in many ways
this expansion of "liberty" has served as a structural countermeasure to the
deficiencies of legislative politics. The reasoning of Obergefell adds the
right to equal dignity to the freedoms previously safeguarded by the Due
Process Clause-recognizing the special need for the protection of
historically subordinated groups. In doing so, the Court acknowledged the
true purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment: to truly protect the autonomy,
dignity, and equality of all people. Sometimes, that requires the Court to
show special solicitude to those unable to see their rights vindicated through
more traditional political processes.
As a result, historical stereotypes and technicalities of legal doctrine
need no longer stand between a woman and her equitable place in society.
Recent decisions have revealed a Court that is willing to see through
purportedly neutral laws which in effect perpetuate invidious discrimination
and subordination. In Obergefell, the Court recognized that "traditional
marriage" was a poor justification for classifying an entire group as social

100. Obergefell, 153 S. Ct. at 2600.
101. Especially when considering the unique subordination public insurance coverage
restrictions inflict on low-income women.
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outcasts. 102
In Whole Woman's Health, the Court understood that
"protecting women's health" did not justify violating women's autonomy. 103
Similarly, the Court may soon have occasion to condemn the Hyde
Amendment and similar restrictions for what they really are: retrograde
attempts to force lower-income women into the State's "own vision of the
woman's role." 1 04 As Justice Thomas' correctly observed, the majority's
opinion in Obergefell opened the door for the Court to require the
government to remedy this gross inequality of its own creation. And through
that door, the government must now pass, for the sake of the most
marginalized women of our society. There is no reason for such injustice to
continue any longer. This Article laid out a new legal strategy and abortion
rights advocates are well advised to embrace the theories of
antisubordination liberty and fulfilled due process in their quest.

102.
103.
104.

Obergefell, 153 S. Ct. at 2600.
Whole Woman's Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
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